Nuclear Deterrence and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in Russia and the United States by Taylor, Anneke R
The Commons: Puget Sound Journal of Politics 
Volume 1 Issue 2 Article 4 
March 2021 
Nuclear Deterrence and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in Russia 
and the United States 
Anneke R. Taylor 
University of Puget Sound, artaylor@pugetsound.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/thecommons 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Relations Commons, Peace and 
Conflict Studies Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the Science and Technology Studies 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Taylor, Anneke R. (2021) "Nuclear Deterrence and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in Russia and the United 
States," The Commons: Puget Sound Journal of Politics: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/thecommons/vol1/iss2/4 
This Synthesis/ Argument papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications at Sound 
Ideas. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Commons: Puget Sound Journal of Politics by an authorized editor 
of Sound Ideas. For more information, please contact soundideas@pugetsound.edu. 
In early 2020, the Pentagon confirmed the deployment of a new low-yield
nuclear weapon, the W76-2, to an unspecified number of Trident submarines
in the US.¹ The military already owns air-dropped bombs of a similar size, but
government officials argue that a submarine-launched weapon is strategically
important and is a necessary addition.² This is a major change in direction for
U.S. nuclear policy, as no significant new nuclear weapons have been added to
the arsenal in decades.³ These attempts to “modernize” the nuclear arsenal by
producing new weapons in the midst of increasingly problematic relations
with Russia have caused concern about a new arms race or even the possibility
of war. While military officials such as John Rood, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, argue that the new low-yield weapon “strengthens
deterrence and provides the United States with a prompt, more survivable
low-yield strategic weapon,” other military strategists, academics, and US
representatives argue that low yield weapons increase the likelihood of war by
lowering the threshold between conventional and nuclear warfare.⁴ I argue
that while low-yield weapons might, in certain circumstances, contribute to
nuclear deterrence, they introduce far too many destabilizing factors for any
additional level of deterrence to be worth the risk.
This article will explore the deterrence value of low-yield nuclear
weapons (LYNWs) and their role in increasing the likelihood of a war that
involves the use of both low-yield and standard yield nuclear weapons. The
recent tensions between the US and Russia over the inclusion of LYNWs in
Russian military strategy will serve as a case study. While it is uncertain
whether or not the Russian military truly has an “escalate to de-escalate'' war
plan involving LYNWs, as intelligence and government reports are
contradictory, the fact remains that US officials have based military actions
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yield lower than approximately 20 kilotons. For clarity, this article will use
only the term “low-yield,” but the sources cited may use either of the three
terms.
Arguments for and against the deployment of LYNWs center around
deterrence theory and mutually assured destruction. Deterrence, in its
simplest form, is the attempt to add as many costs as possible to an enemy
state’s cost/benefit analysis of whether the monetary, structural, and human
life costs of war are worth the gain in territory, resources, idealistic motives, or
any other factor a nation might hold as beneficial. Nuclear deterrence rests on
the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which assumes that a war
between any nuclear-armed states will result in a quick and devastating
destruction of both countries (as well as their neighbors and allies), due to the
massive impact of nuclear weapons (including radioactive fallout and other
radiation effects) and the relative ease of using them.¹¹ Theoretically, nuclear-
armed states are therefore faced with two possible outcomes: peace, if
weapons are not used, or complete destruction of all parties involved if
weapons are used. However, LYNWs complicate the special status of nuclear
weapons as potentially extinction event-inducing devices and may undermine
nuclear deterrence by appearing to reduce the threat of total mutual
destruction.
Government proponents of adding LYNWs to the U.S. nuclear arsenal
argue that the weapons fill an essential gap in an attempt to match that of
Russia’s and without them the US remains vulnerable.¹² This argument is
based on Russia’s reported but not confirmed “escalate to de-escalate” plan,
which holds that, should a European war erupt and endanger Russian
territory, Russia would launch low-yield weapons at tactical targets in Europe,
forcing their opponents to surrender.¹³ The alternative to European surrender
to Russian forces is theorized to be a counter deployment and detonation of a
U.S. low-yield weapon.¹⁴ Low-yield weapon advocates argue that having this
option available would extend deterrence from large scale conflict to smaller
scale conflict, as well as preclude Russia from attempting this “escalate to de-
escalate” tactic.¹⁵ Some defense experts, like Elbridge Colby, argue that a
smaller scale nuclear war would be preferable to a large scale war, and that we
should pursue proliferation to increase deterrence.¹⁶ These arguments
downplay the importance of two key dangers: the potential escalation from
small-scale, low-yield nuclear warfare to larger-scale, standard or high-yield
and strategy on the existence of this plan and on the assumption that Russia
has LYNWs in its nuclear arsenal. This is perhaps an indication that the new
deployments are a result of an aggressive military culture rather than of
strategic thinking. The deployment of LYNWs also carries several risks, which
negate any deterrence value which comes from additional nuclear weapons.
Firstly, the apparent smaller impact and more practical scale of LYNWs both
lower the threshold between nuclear and conventional warfare. Secondly,
there is a possibility that warring states might not know which type of weapon
is being deployed, due to the frequent dual-use of launch systems for both high
and low yield weapons. Thirdly, according to war game simulations, a real war
involving the use of LYNWs, even if a yield limit was somehow maintained,
would likely still cause huge civilian casualties and destruction on a massive
scale. Lastly, it is possible that the use of the standard, non-nuclear deterrence
is sufficient. In this case, the deployment of any new nuclear weapons would
be a pointlessly risky move. All of these factors make extremely destructive
nuclear war more, not less, likely when states add low-yield warheads to their
arsenals.
The W76-2 warhead is estimated to have a yield of around six kilotons,
about a third of the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.⁵
Trident submarines are already equipped with similar warheads, the yields of
which are between 90 and 450 kilotons.⁶ While there is no official size
threshold that defines a weapon as low-yield, they are generally considered to
be weapons smaller than the nuclear bombs dropped in WWII.⁷ However, a
six-kiloton weapon is still five hundred times more powerful than the “most
powerful conventional explosive in the US arsenal.”⁸ LYNWs are often
referred to as “tactical” or “non-strategic” weapons, which are designed for use
on the battlefield during a military conflict, but they could also be used
strategically.⁹ With recent developments in targeting technology, the line
between strategic and tactical has become increasingly blurred.¹⁰ Large
nuclear weapons are usually considered to be strategic, as they can be used to
bomb large civilian populations, however low-yield weapons could also be
used on civilians as well. In general, the terms “tactical,” “non-strategic,” and
“low-yield” are used interchangeably, meaning there is no longer any real
distinction between them in terms of deterrence. All are assumed to have a
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nuclear warfare and the enormous death toll that would likely result from even
a limited nuclear warfare.
Key arguments against the deployment of LYNWs focus on the possibility
of escalation to the use of high-yield nuclear weapons once the nuclear
threshold has been lowered. Many argue that having a less destructive nuclear
option makes the choice to shift to nuclear weapons easier, because the low-
yield weapons can be used tactically or in smaller strategic areas. Additionally,
LYNWs may not appear as likely to lead to an outcome of mutual destruction.
These weapons are more “survivable,” meaning that the effects and
externalities of LYNW deployment and detonation are perceived to be less
severe than those assumed of a traditional, twenty kiloton to megaton size,
nuclear bomb.¹⁷ The use of LYNWs could potentially lead to higher-yield
nuclear war, as the nuclear threshold would have already been lowered with
the use of lower-yield weapons.
General Andre Beaufre, a “renowned military thinker and strategist,”
writes that when low-yield weapons are introduced and the nuclear threshold
is lowered, “the risk of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear war increases.”¹⁸
Although Beaufre argues for the deterrence value of LYNWs, Beaufre still
acknowledges the danger of LYNW use potentially lowering the nuclear
threshold. Once a nation detects that a nuclear weapon has been launched at
them, they probably do not have time to assess the yield of the weapon and
resulting damage, and as a result, will retaliate using whatever nuclear
weapons they have in their arsenal. This makes communication between
warring states impossible in the short run because the country being attacked
does not know what is happening. If a submarine were to launch a warhead,
the enemy would be unable to differentiate between a small weapon,
supposedly meant to prevent escalation, and a large weapon. The enemy
would then be forced to choose between retaliating at full strength or possibly
under-reacting to a serious threat, giving up their crucial window for a second
strike.¹⁹ This has been an issue with other low-yield nuclear weapons,
including Pakistan’s launching systems that work for both conventional and
nuclear weapons, and the existing US warheads with adjustable yields.²⁰ This
difficulty of differentiation is a significant issue when considering the
deterrent effects of low-yield weapons, as, in certain cases, it negates any
additional deterrence a low-yield weapon would produce since there is no way
to tell which weapon is being used. This potential for escalation from a
relatively contained nuclear conflict to a full nuclear war makes low-yield
weapons, at least as they are currently deployed, dangerously unpredictable.
Additionally, any “special” deterrence value ascribed to LYNWs is nulled by
the fact that, in reality, warring states do not set kiloton yield limits before
engaging in battle and in most cases would not have time to assess damage
before retaliating. AsMichael Krepon argues: “if two states have screwed up so
badly that they have used nuclear weapons on a battlefield, how are they
supposed to agree on the number of detonations and yields?”²¹
While proponents of low-yield nuclear weapons argue that these
weapons strengthen deterrence, proponents also maintain that a war
involving their use could remain small in scale and not necessarily progress to
an all-out nuclear war.²² This assumption is key to such an argument, but can
easily be dissolved, as was discussed previously. While I would argue that
nuclear war of any scope should be avoided, some see a limited nuclear war as
a reasonable possibility. Experts like Elbridge Colby argue that a nuclear war
conducted using only low-yield weapons would be an acceptable risk to take
for the supposed increase in deterrence.²³ If the argument that LYNWs
increase deterrence is sound, why is Colby’s argument necessary? The limited
actual usefulness of low yield warheads off of the battlefield and the
probability of extensive civilian casualties are too significant to ignore in
discussions of the supposed deterrent properties of low-yield weapons.²⁴
Firstly, low-yield weaponsmay not be practical for battlefield use, as their
sheer size and possible unpredictability could possibly endanger weapon-
deploying combatants and could interfere with attempts to advance into
irradiated territory.²⁵ This could drive the deployment and detonation away
from the main arena of combat to an alternative site, possibly one near
civilians, where “ease” of use is more assured. Aside from causing civilian
casualties by way of civilian-targeted retaliation, expanding beyond military
targets could encourage the use of more, possibly higher-yield weapons and
escalate the conflict to a traditional nuclear war.
Secondly, “low-yield” weapons are still incredibly deadly. According to
expert Daniel Hooey, “initial wargames and exercises in the 1950s [with low-
yield nuclear weapons] revealed that ‘in only 9 days of simulated nuclear
combat, West Germany was judged to have suffered three times the civilian
casualties of [World War II].’... LYNWs introduce additional factors that must
be carefully considered, such as increased potential for miscalculation, nuclear
accidents, and unauthorized use.”²⁶ The outcomes of this simulation
demonstrate how destructive even an exclusively low-yield war could be.
When the difficulty of limiting weapons in a nuclear war to a smaller yield is
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considered, the scale of this supposedly preferable war begins to look very
similar to the scale that would assure mutual destruction.
The recent U.S. deployment of new LYNWs as a response to the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” plan discussed previously brings up another issue
behind arguments advocating for LYNWs: these weapons and their
deployment may not be truly motivated by strategy at all. Supporters of the
anti-low-yield position, including Michael Krepon, argue that the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” plan that is considered the most compelling
justification for LYNWdeployment is essentially non-existent. They argue that
the deployment of LYNWs is due to the U.S. military’s desire to build up the
nuclear arsenal based on groundless rumor.²⁷ In her 2016 analysis of Russian
nuclear doctrine, Olga Oliker argues that there is no evidence that the “escalate
to de-escalate” tactic is part of any legitimate Russian war plan.²⁸ As the tactic
involves shifting from conventional to nuclear weaponry, this tactic would
require Russia to lower their nuclear threshold, and increase their willingness
to shift from conventional to nuclear weapons, which would be a bold and
dangerous choice.²⁹ She argues that if the US were to incorporate low-yield
weapons into their arsenal and lower their nuclear threshold to match Russian
actions, particularly if accompanied by the development of more “usable”
nuclear weapons,³⁰ both states would significantly increase the risk of nuclear
war.³¹ Oliker adds that, even if Russia is considering the deployment of
LYNWs as a part of their “escalate to de-escalate” plan, Russia might see
increased American investment in LYNWs as an indication of the weakness of
the U.S. conventional war machine, further encouraging aggressive action
from Russia.³²
In addition, while the US government would perhaps argue that
deploying their own low-yield warheads would be intended purely for defense
and deterrence, increased investment in and improvement of U.S. offensive
capabilities could be interpreted by Russia as a response to their own earlier
development and deployment of low-yield nuclear weaponry. This is a classic
example of the security dilemma³³ and means that the deployment of new US
low-yield weapons would probably only increase tensions between the US and
Russia. The fact that the U.S. government’s primary justification for the recent
and continued development of low-yield weapons is a hypothetical,
unconfirmed Russian war plan demonstrates that arguments for adding more
LYNWs to the arsenal may be more motivated by a nuclear-focused and
aggressive military culture than by actual benefits to nuclear deterrence.
Lastly, this discussion of nuclear deterrence in the context of LYNWs
begets a larger question about the actual efficacy of nuclear deterrence as a
means of dissuading conflict: is deterrence as a whole — that is, the total cost/
benefit analysis of all aspects of warfare — as opposed to nuclear deterrence
the operative mechanism in obstructing potential world war? Perhaps the U.S.
and Russia never felt that a full-on war, be it nuclear or conventional, would
be worth the costs, given what little gain would come from war based on
idealistic differences with no extant threat to either homeland.³⁴ Perhaps
ordinary deterrence, not mutually assured destruction, was what prevented
the Cold War from ever becoming hot; without the long range, immensely
destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons, war perhaps never would have
happened.³⁵ If this is the case, then there is no need for any further nuclear
proliferation, which has the potential to escalate quickly, and even
accidentally, from the use of low-yield weapons, because then deterrence
would not be based on nuclear capabilities at all.³⁶ Even if MAD has indeed
been the only means of preventing war, filling the small theoretical gap in
deterrence with low-yield weapons is not worth the risk of a lowered threshold
to nuclear escalation. Since we can never know exactly the reason why large
scale nuclear war has never become a reality, it is never advisable to introduce
new nuclear weapons into an already massively destructive stockpile.
Rather than contributing to deterrence, LYNWs weaken deterrence by
making nuclear weapons appear as a more realistic option for use on the
battlefield. LYNWs do not carry the stigma of traditional nuclear weapons, and
therefore may be considered for practical use in military plans, weakening the
all-or-nothing deterrence of MAD and encouraging nuclear war. Additionally,
sinceMAD or nuclear deterrence may not be themain factor in preventing war
in all cases, stockpiling additional LYNWs would only increase international
tensions. Warring states would not be able to assess damage or yield before
retaliating without missing a crucial second-strike window and would be
compelled to escalate conflict. In addition, most LYNWs are housed in multi-
purpose launch systems, meaning that a targeted nation would have no way of
knowing what kind of weapon had been launched. In the case of recent events,
many arguments for the deployment of LYNWs center around the Russian
“escalate to de-escalate” tactic and hold that additional U.S. LYNWs are
necessary to maintain a deterrent balance between the US’s and Russia’s
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nuclear capabilities. However, the legitimacy of the pro-LYNWs argument is
undercut by the possible fictitiousness of the Russian war plan itself. The fact
that real US deployments have been justified by questionable intelligence from
Russia indicates that perhaps these deployments are not strategic, but rather
a product of a nuclear-focused defense apparatus and an administration
inclined towards intimidation through stockpiling. The lowering of the
threshold for nuclear war that the adoption of low-yield nuclear weapons
would likely assure demonstrates that LYNWs do not contribute to the
protection of peace through nuclear deterrence and that further deployment
would be dangerous and unnecessary.
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